Philosophical Arguments, Historical Contexts, and Theory of Education by Tröhler, Daniel
 Educational Philosophy and Theory
 
doi: 10.1111/j.1469-5812.2007.00235.x
 
© 2007 The Author
Journal compilation © 2007 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia
Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and
350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
 
Blackwell Publishing LtdOxford, UKEPATducational Philosophy and Theory0013-1857© 2007 Phi osophy of Education Society of AustralasiaFebruary 2007391 rigin l ArticlePhil sophical Arguments, Hist rical Contexts, and Theory of EducationD n el Tröh er
Philosophical Arguments, Historical 
Contexts, and Theory of Education
 
1
 
D
 

 
 
 
T
 

 
University of Applied Sciences, Zurich and the Pestalozzianum Research Institute for the 
History of Education 
 
Abstract
 
This paper argues that many philosophical arguments within the education discourse are
too little embedded in their own historical contexts. Starting out from the obvious fact that
philosophers of education use sources from the past, the paper asks how we can deal with
the arguments that these sources contain. The general attitude within philosophy of education,
which views arguments as timeless, is being challenged by the insight that arguments always
depend upon their own contexts. For this reason, citing past authors, heroes, or enemies
without respecting the context says more about our interest at the present time than it does
about the times of the authors examined. Conversely, the contextual approach helps us to avoid
believing that ‘timeless truths’ are to be found in different texts of different ages. However,
the present contribution in no way advocates a total relativization of statements. Quite the
contrary; it claims that the contextual approach helps us to understand the traditions and
contexts within which we ourselves, as researchers, are positioned. And this self-awareness
is believed to be the proper starting position for theoretical statements about education.
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1. Outlining the Problem
 
Seven years ago, in March 1997, the 
 
New York Review of Books
 
 published an essay
with the interesting title, 
 
George Washington’s False Teeth
 
, which recently appeared
also in book form.
 
2
 
 The author of the essay, historian Robert Darnton, is famous
for his extensive research specializing in the second half of the 18
 
th
 
 century in
Europe. Darnton writes that one of the most interesting sights on a tour of Mount
Vernon is the display of the false teeth that belonged to the first President of the
United States. When he looked at Washington’s dentures, Darnton was reminded
of a question that friends had often asked him, namely, if he, as a specialist in the
field, would prefer to live in the 18
 
th
 
 century rather than in the 20
 
th
 
.
For a historian, Darnton says, this question is difficult to answer. But, if he lived
in the 18
 
th
 
 century, he would first of all ‘insist on being born well above the peasantry’.
And second, he writes: ‘No toothache, please. While reading thousands of letters
from people in all walks of 18
 
th
 
-century life, I have often encountered toothaches.
 Philosophical Arguments, Historical Contexts, and Theory of Education
 
11
 
© 2007 The Author
Journal compilation © 2007 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia
 
The pain cuts through the archaic language, and the writer looms up in your imagina-
tion, waiting in dread for an itinerant tooth-puller to arrive in town and, by a brief
bout of torture, to put an end to the long weeks of agony’ (Darnton, 1997, p. 38).
Darnton’s account of visiting Mount Vernon is probably not invented, but was it
really reason enough to write an essay about George Washington’s false teeth and
for the 
 
New York Review of Books
 
 to publish it? Of course not, for Darnton’s actual
aim is to foster discussion of a historiographical problem. That problem becomes
manifest in the general opinion that the (late) 20
 
th
 
 century is more or less the
hereditary descendant of the 
 
Enlightenment
 
, and even more, of 
 
the
 
 Enlightenment.
Darnton criticizes the inflated use of the term ‘enlightenment’ for almost all non-
reactionary phenomena of the 18
 
th
 
 century, because blown up to such a size, it
loses its meaning: ‘The Enlightenment is beginning to be everything, and therefore
nothing’ (p. 34). Darnton is aiming for two things. First, he wants to ‘reduce the
Enlightenment to manageable proportions’ (p. 34f.). There is, he says, no homog-
enous intellectual tradition that can be called the Enlightenment. He therefore
proposes limiting the notion to the place where the idea was ‘born’ and to its
exponents—to Paris and the circle of people who called themselves ‘
 
philosophes
 
’ and
that represented a very different concept of modern thinking than, let’s say, David
Hume, Adam Smith, Edmund Burke, Winckelmann, Immanuel Kant, or Goethe.
In other words, the Enlightenment is, according to Darnton, a historically and
locally specific way of thinking. And the second thing Darnton wants to discuss is
the problem that the inflated use of ‘Enlightenment’ leads to a facile identification
of the ideas of the 18
 
th
 
 century with all modernity, as synonymous with much of
what is subsumed under the name of Western civilization. Thus it can be easily
made ‘responsible for almost everything that causes discontent, especially in the
camps of postmodernists and anti-Westernizers’ (p. 35).
Darnton’s two problems—the geographical homogenizing of the discussions in
the 18
 
th
 
 century to the idea of 
 
the
 
 Enlightenment as well as the historic homoge-
nizing by assuming the 20
 
th
 
 century to be the heir of the 
 
Enlightenment
 
—both stem
from an academic point of view that essentially pays too little attention to historical
contexts. I would like to discuss the problems that can result when we in education
pay too little attention to the historical contexts. I choose as an example a talk
given by Richard Smith in Leuven, Belgium, last autumn at the annual meeting of
an international research project called 
 
Philosophy and History of the Discipline of
Education: Evaluation and Evolution of the Criteria for Educational Research
 
. To be
clear: In no way do I wish to offend the author or question the concerns that he
has. I will also in no way judge the lucidity of his arguments or his hermeneutic
competency. What I am interested in is the way in which ‘arguments’ are used to
endorse these concerns—and in the question of how any modern theory of educa-
tion has to deal with arguments that stem from the past.
 
2. Arguments Without Context
 
In his paper ‘As if by Machinery: The levelling of educational research’, Smith
observes a tendency in current educational research that he labels ‘levelling’. The
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search for the cause of this ‘pernicious’ tendency leads him back to 1620, when
Francis Bacon published 
 
Novum Organum
 
 (The New Organon). In the preface to
that work, Bacon pleaded for new methods, so that ‘doing science’ would be ‘as if
by machinery’. Now Richard Smith doesn’t call into question the use of and the
need for methods, but he raises suspicions concerning the ‘democratic’ implica-
tion of these ideas. Smith recapitulates that at the end of his first book, Bacon
emphasizes that ‘almost anyone can use the new method he advocates’ (Smith,
2003, p. 2). Smith then cites part of Bacon’s 72
 
nd
 
 aphorism: ‘But the course I
propose for the discovery of sciences is such as leaves but little to the acuteness
and strength of wits, but places all wits and understandings nearly on a level’.
To explain the problem that he has with Bacon, Smith then takes a text that was
published 120 years later, David Hume’s 
 
Treatise on Human Nature
 
 (1739/1740).
The core citation is a passage in Book I, where Hume talks about ‘rules’ of
research—which Smith identifies as the Baconian ‘method’. Hume wrote: ‘All
the rules of this nature are very easy in their invention, but extremely difficult
in their application; and even experimental philosophy, which seems the most
natural and simple of any, requires the utmost stretch of human judgement’
(Hume, 1739/1740/1961, p. 172). Hume ‘puts the matter very aptly’, Smith says.
Why? Because applying whatever rules are stipulated still requires judgement, as
Hume emphasized.
But Hume himself emphasizes the fact that the application requires ‘judgement’.
And, Smith says, ‘there cannot be further rules for their application’; or if there are,
there cannot be an endless series of such rules. ( … ) And judgement is not a faculty
that can be readily ‘levelled’, in Bacon’s terms’. ‘Judgement’ is the core term Smith
uses to ‘prove’ that Bacon’s term of ‘levelling’ could be easily misunderstood. ‘The
qualities that make up judgement—flexibility, attentiveness, suitable experience and
so on—are found more in some people than in others. They are found for instance
in those who have a rich acquaintance with the subject-matter in hand, and in
those prepared to attune themselves to the subject-matter rather than to treat it as
one more field for the operation of pre-established skills and techniques’ (Smith,
2003, p. 3).
In contrast though, nowadays ‘almost any aspiring researcher’ uses research
methods regardless of ‘his intellectual sophistication, quality of judgement and
understanding of the subject being researched,’ Smith complains, and he charac-
terizes this phenomenon as ‘continuation of the Baconian tradition’. Methodolog-
ically based research, irrespective of its specific value, causes problems when it
‘stand[s] in for the cultivation of judgement and insight, and for acquaintance with
the broader background of ideas and theory’; it even distracts from such cultivation
and acquaintance and reduces the time available for them. Smith cites his Oxford
colleague, the philosopher of education Richard Pring, who complains that ‘much
educational research espouses controversial philosophical positions without any
recognition of the philosophical problems which they raise and which often have
been well rehearsed by philosophers from Plato onwards’ (Pring, 2000, pp. 5–6).
Philosophers of education, obviously, use past sources. With ‘past’ I am talking
about the works of dead, Western, white men, like those cited earlier—Plato,
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Bacon, and Hume—and in other texts we find Kant, Hegel, and others too. What
in the eye of an historian is so surprising is—and here we find the parallel to
Darnton’s complaints—that statements of former times seem to be used easily to
build either a straight line to our present time—sometimes of decline or of
advancement—or to compose a homogenous forum—some kind of an ‘original
position’ (John Rawls)—where ‘true’ arguments are being exchanged. There are so
many texts where you get the impression that, let’s say, Plato, Locke, Rousseau,
Kant, and Karl Marx are talking together at the same time in the same place—and
we don’t know whether to imagine Plato’s academy, the Dutch exile of Locke, the
village of Môtiers, the remoteness of Königsberg, or the British Library (where
Marx worked). Would Plato think the same way in the 19
 
th
 
 century as he did almost
400 years before Christ? In other words: How can we imagine that a philosopher
at the end of the Peloponnesian War living in a hectic and complex political situa-
tion is talking about the same thing when discussing ‘truth’ or ‘idea’ or ‘justice’ as
a late 18
 
th
 
-century Pietist living in remote East Prussia? How do we know that a
metaphor like the one ‘as if by machinery’ used by a British lawyer in 1620 refers
to the same thing that it does in our postindustrial time? Sources are only sources
when they represent in some way their own historic context, and not 
 
our
 
 concerns
or problems.
 
3. Arguments in Context
 
I think the idea of ‘talking together’ is a fruitful image if we restrict it to contem-
porary discussions. Let me demonstrate this in detail by means of Francis Bacon.
 
Novum Organum
 
, published in 1620, is the first and only printed part of his
planned work 
 
Instauratio Magna
 
 (The Great Instauration). Bacon was not a philos-
opher, but a broadly educated lawyer and politician. Due to political intrigues in
that year of 1620, Bacon was forced to resign from government office, and he devoted
himself to his philosophic work. But he died just six years later, having published
only the first part of his work. The 
 
Novum Organum
 
 has a famous frontispiece,
about which the book says little. But in 
 
The Advancement of Learning
 
, a book
published 15 years previously and the only work Bacon wrote originally in English,
Bacon describes the scene depicted in this frontispiece in a dedication to the new
king of England, Jacob I, the Stuart successor of Elizabeth who had died in 1603.
 
3
 
Bacon writes in 1605:
‘… there is not any more worthy [act] than the further endowment of the
world with sound and fruitful knowledge. For why should a few received
authors stand up like Hercules’ columns, beyond which there should be
no sailing or discovering, since we have so bright and benign a star as
your Majesty to conduct and prosper us?’. (Bacon, 1605/1973, p. 61)
Obviously Bacon is dissatisfied with the limiting of knowledge to ‘a few received
authors’. If Richard Smith is tracing a line from dull, contemporary educational
research back to Bacon by blaming the ‘levelling’ of science that put aside any
intelligent judgement, Bacon has to be defended. Bacon says:
 14
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‘For it generally happens that men make their trials carelessly, and as it
were in play; slightly varying experiments already known, and, if the thing
does not answer, growing weary and abandoning the attempt. And even if
they apply themselves to experiments more seriously and earnestly and
laboriously, still they spend their labour in working out some one
experiment, as Gilbert with the magnet, and the chemists with gold; a
course of proceeding not less unskilful in the design than small in the
attempt. For no one successfully investigates the nature of a thing in the
thing itself; the inquiry must be enlarged so as to become more general’.
(Bacon, 1620/1997, § LXX)
And if Richard Smith seems to complain that Bacon had an attitude that might be
labelled ‘democratic’, we have to ask why he did and what its purpose was in his
time. Cambridge historian Richard Tuck has taught us that the roots of this think-
ing lie in the so-called Venetian Tacitism or Tacitist Humanism (Tuck, 1993, pp.
105ff.), which was popular in Bacon’s times and almost timelessly deposited in
Shakespeare’s 
 
Tragedy of King Richard the Second
 
, first performed in 1595. Virtue is
the key word of this political ideology—an ideology that later was realized some-
what unfortunately in the English Commonwealth in the mid-17
 
th
 
 century.
The political-scientific-human ideal of Bacon and this Venetian republican tradi-
tion of Tacitus refer to his emphasis on activity for the benefit of the people. There
is a strong ethical implication in Bacon’s program of fostering the modern way of
gaining knowledge. Now, Bacon’s ideas did not come to him 
 
deus ex machina
 
.
Bacon lived in a time that is considered to be the beginning of capitalistic society.
Here are some highlights of Bacon’s times and context:
• In 1570 Thomas Gresham erected the London stock market;
• In 1586 Sir Walter Raleigh attempted to found the colony of Virginia;
• In 1588 the Great Armada was beaten and thus Britain won naval supremacy;
• In 1600 the East India Company was established.
It is no coincidence that in the frontispiece I mentioned above, Bacon showed a
ship sailing to new worlds, needing new and better knowledge for safer sailing and
coming home with new knowledge, knowledge that neither Aristotelianism nor
scepticism could ever imagine. What Bacon tried to do was just to be active and
curious, to separate miracles from knowledge, and to invent a method with which
knowledge becomes knowledge. We should not forget that only five years before
Bacon wrote his 
 
Advancement of Learning
 
 in 1605, the Roman Catholic Church
murdered Giordano Bruno also because he believed in the heliocentric system.
One might argue that this is correct, but insist that Bacon was the first man of
the time that we call the ‘scientific revolution’ and, therefore, tracing this back to
Bacon appears to be reasonable. One might say that to define a context only using
some information about trade and commerce and republican ideals is not enough
to change the picture. However, Bacon was not the first experimenter at all, as we
will see, and even worse, there was no scientific revolution at all, as Steven Shapin
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has shown in his book 
 
The Scientific Revolution
 
, which begins: ‘There was no such
thing as the Scientific Revolution and this is a book about it’ (Shapin, 1996, p. 1).
On a trip to Paris in 1576, Bacon had already visited Bernard Palissy (1510–1590),
a famous potter who was advocating the importance of experiments, collection of
specimens, and teaching by means of practical demonstrations, and he must have
known Giambattista Della Portas’ (1535–1615) 
 
Magia Naturalis
 
 (1558), in which
the author examines the natural world claiming it can be manipulated by the
natural philosopher through theoretical and practical experiments (see Clubb,
1965). Besides Bacon, in England William Gilbert (1544–1603)
 
4
 
 and William
Harvey (1578–1657)
 
5
 
 belonged to the experimentalists (Pumfrey, 2002; Cunning-
ham, 2002), although Bacon felt that he himself was more sophisticated than the
empiricist Gilbert. Bacon was in lively public discussion with his forerunners of
empirical research in the 16
 
th
 
 century.
 
6
 
I in no way want to construe a different—that is, earlier—starting point of
modern science than Bacon. There was, namely, no identifiable starting point, and
it certainly did not start with one single person. I think Steven Shapin is right when
he argues that ‘science is a historically situated and social activity and it is to be
understood in relation to the 
 
contexts
 
 in which it occurs’. It is ‘a collectively prac-
ticed, historically embedded phenomenon, inviting readers to see whether the
account is plausible, coherent, and interesting’. And I agree with Shapin that the
old debate about the priority of intellectual factors versus social factors is fruitless.
If science is to be understood as historically situated and in its collective aspect,
then this understanding has to encompass all aspects of science, its ideas, and its
practices, no less than its institutional forms and social uses (Shapin, 1996, p. 9).
If this understanding of history is correct and accepted by the scientific commu-
nity, we have to abandon several ideas about the past that we have held dear. We
will find hardly any epochs like the Enlightenment anymore, no beginnings or
endings of epochs; we will recognize that there 
 
are
 
 heroes or classics of the several
disciplines, but that they are 
 
construed
 
 as classics later on. And historian Quentin
Skinner said, while arguing in favour of research of contexts rather than of ‘pure’
ideas, that a historiographical concept such as this ‘leaves the traditional figure of
the author in extremely poor health’ (Skinner, 1988b, p. 276). The leave-taking of
those ideas of the past opens up the field of historical research. What we will find
are different settings of discussions, problem solving, debates, or discourses, defin-
ing the problems as problems and trying to find answers—in their time and for
their time.
 
4. Empiry versus Empiricism
 
Of course, historians can talk this way. They can limit their research to decon-
structing historical constructions, they can relativize ‘big names’, dissolve argu-
ments in contexts, and give a shrug when we ask—what is it all about? What help
is this? As educationalists we find ourselves in quite a different position from
historians, because—at the end—we need to be able to formulate normative state-
ments. Education is a social practice that can be done better or worse, and our job
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is to find relevant arguments for the better and the worse. But if ‘pure’ arguments
of our historic heroes or enemies may not be cited anymore, and history further-
more just reconstructs contexts rather than the dignity of single arguments, the
theorist does not know where to take arguments from anymore. Or, in other words
and referring to Richard Smith: If everything seems to be empirical, where is the
faculty of judgement? Hence: don’t the arguments that I make here reinforce
Richard Smith’s position?
I don’t think so. I would like to draw an important distinction between empiry
and empiricism. For to abandon the idea of the existence of pure arguments of any
philosopher does not mean at all that we have to be thrown into blindly counting
sacks of pepper in the harbours of India or registering tobacco bales in Virginia. I
agree with Richard Smith that much modern research in education is dull, not
because of Bacon, but because of its empiricist setting. The problem of empiricism
is not the lack of eternal ideas, but the frequent lack of reflective thinking on the
basic question. If the questions, as the basis of research, are in any case inescapably
historic, meaning empirical, we find that empiricist studies often are not empirical
enough. Or, in other words: empiricism often lacks empiry as much as strictly
philosophical approaches do, too.
The question we are really discussing is how to handle the incompatible alterna-
tives of dogmatism and scepticism, or of philosophy without empirical context and
empiricism without reflection. That was the problem Bacon was facing, and many
others throughout history, too. I think that even pragmatism developed out of such
a problem. The historic differences are indicated by the way in which this problem
was understood or interpreted, how solutions were developed, how they were influ-
enced by other contemporary solutions or by their interpretations of past authors,
and how they were able to convince their contemporaries. So what a historical
study has to do, in other words, is to reconstruct how the diverse discourses
developed, which of the discourses gained dominance—and why and for how long.
And this character of research is empirical in the sense that we try to see whether
or not a certain mode of thinking—or ‘discourse’ if you want to be both popular
and somewhat fuzzy—has predominated or not.
History in this sense is 
 
at the same time
 
 philosophical and empirical, because it
wants to understand beliefs and commitments that grew or disappeared against the
background of specific social and intellectual developments and conditions. Inevi-
tably, this forces research to include examination of not very readily accessible
pamphlets, clandestine literature, manuscripts, or simply ‘forgotten’ books and
magazines. Historical work thereby takes on an archaeological character. ‘This
historian is in considerable measure an archaeologist; he is engaged in uncovering
the presence of various language contexts in which discourse has from time to time
been conducted’ (Pocock, 1987, p. 23). The claim that philosophical arguments
can only be understood by reconstructing the linguistic context is not the same as
to be un-philosophical. It is just another understanding of philosophy than the
traditional, a post-idealist philosophy influenced by the so-called ‘linguistic turn.’
Quentin Skinner referred explicitly to John G. A. Pocock when defining the work
of historians as the study, primarily, of the ‘ “languages” of discourses, and only
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secondarily of the relationship between individual contributions to such languages’
(p. 276f.).
 
7
 
 The 
 
langue
 
 is the ideological context, and it has ‘the character of
paradigms’ (p. 21).
To go back to the example of Bacon: The Royal Academy of the 17
 
th
 
 century
proves that the critique of dogmatic idealism was widely received (Osterwalder,
1999). They construed their hero, Francis Bacon, as shown in the frontispiece
 
8
 
 of
Thomas Sprats’ 1667 
 
History of the Royal Society
 
. A bust of the Restoration king,
Charles II, rests on a column that is flanked to the left by the President of the
Royal Society and to the right by Francis Bacon, who had died forty years before.
Above them we see the maxim 
 
Nullius in verba
 
—no truth lies in words, but only in
things. Accordingly, a small library symbolizing ‘ancient philosophy’ is shown
almost hidden in the shadows, while Bacon points to a set of illuminated instru-
ments used in experiments and modern mechanics. Standing fully illuminated by
the sun is the instrument that was responsible for the enormous success of the
Royal Academy, Robert Boyle’s air pump.
But whether or not the Royal Academy is the true heir of Bacon and his time is
another question—the members believed that they were, and they needed a past
hero to legitimize the Academy itself.
 
9
 
 Looking historically at history means not
forgetting that, for example, Thomas Hobbes could be called an heir as well, but
a different one, and that England had other discourses that we can identify today—
John Milton’s religious civic humanism and the so-called Cambridge Platonists like
Henry Moore, Benjamin Whichcote, or Ralph Cudworth. We must not forget that
17
 
th
 
-century Great Britain was a time of deep political, social, economic, and
religious crisis—it is no coincidence that Hobbes was writing 
 
Leviathan
 
 in his exile
in France, no coincidence that hundreds of so-called Puritans moved to the New
World when the idea of the commonwealth was corrupted by the egomaniacal and
autocratic Cromwell, no coincidence that at the end of the century a second
revolution occurred.
 
5. Arguments, Contexts, and Theory of Education
 
Hence, citing past authors, heroes, or enemies without respecting the context
says more about our interest at the present time than it does about the times of
the cited author. Conversely, the contextual approach helps us to avoid believing
in ‘timeless truths’ to be found in different texts. And moreover, it helps us to
understand the traditions within which we ourselves, as researchers, are posi-
tioned—knowledge that allows us in the end to ‘choose among’, or rather balance,
the different 
 
langues
 
 (Pocock) or ideologies (Skinner). This is not meant to be
psychological, but ideological. ‘To discover’, Skinner says, ‘from the history of
thought that there are in fact no such timeless concepts, but only the various
different concepts which have gone with various different societies, is to discover a
general truth not merely about the past but about ourselves as well’ (Skinner,
1988a, p. 67). To learn from the past means separating necessity from contingency,
which is ‘the key to self-awareness itself ’ (op. cit.). Probably there are eternal
problems, but they show up always in different forms, and we are compelled to
 18
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know the alternative possibilities that have historically grown into our present
time—whether they are dominant or not. If then we resist belief in metaphysical
cues when making choices, all we can do is discuss the advantages and disadvan-
tages of the possibilities that we are aware of 
 
publicly
 
—best of all internationally,
without claiming that 
 
one
 
 solution is 
 
the
 
 best forever. And the informed public
discussion of educated citizens knowing alternatives represents the ideal of the
political system in the Western World today, e.g. democracy.
Therefore, the general truth is that there is no general truth, and that history
changes the problems, the 
 
paroles
 
, and the 
 
langues
 
, as they themselves change
history. For language is not just a reflection of reality, but according to the linguis-
tic turn, it construes reality. History changes the circumstances and provokes new
problems, new 
 
paroles
 
, and they change the 
 
langues
 
. New realities mean new con-
straints and new challenges that need to be mastered or at least answered. But to
give a ‘proper’ answer is not a question of eternal truth, but of the empirical
context—the best advice in the 17
 
th
 
 century may well differ from the best advice
for today, even if the problem in both cases is the ‘same’, such as, for example,
political stability. Many of the problems remain in a certain way the same, but the
answers do not, because the specific questions arising out of the problem are
different. Justice is politically the uppermost good, in Plato’s time as in ours, but
Plato’s answers do not help in an industrialized and democratic society. If we want
to formulate it paradoxically: Everything is the same, and everything has changed.
The question asked of Robert Darnton as to whether he would prefer to live in the
18
 
th
 
 century is legitimate for friends but somehow improper to historians. Tooth-
aches in the 18
 
th century were as dreadful as they are today but also worse, because
we have modern dentistry, and we can trust in fast professional pain relief.
Notes
1. This paper was presented as a lecture at the main conference of the EERA in Crete, 22–
25 September 2004. The core ideas of this paper were first presented in a guest lecture
at Rice University in Houston, Texas, 13 March 2004.
2. Robert Darnton (2003) George Washington’s Teeth. An unconventional guide to the Eighteenth
Century (New York, W. W. Norton).
3. Elizabeth was the daughter of Henry VIII, the first Tudor King, famous for his eight wives
and responsible for the separation of the ‘Anglicana Ecclesia’ from the Roman Catholic
Church in 1534.
4. In his major work, De Magnete (1600), Gilbert boasted rightly that the method evident
in his book was experimental (see Pumfrey, 2002, p. 6).
5. William Harvey is the celebrated discoverer of the circulation of the blood. ‘All of our
modern physiological understanding is based on this discovery’ (Cunningham, 2002, p.
21).
6. ‘The race of chemists, again out of a few experiments of the furnace, have built up a
fantastic philosophy, framed with reference to a few things; and Gilbert also, after he had
employed himself most laboriously in the study and observation of the loadstone,
proceeded at once to construct an entire system in accordance with his favorite subject’
(Bacon, 1620, § LIV).
7. History, Pocock says, is to be understood as interaction between langue and parole
(Pocock, 1987, p. 19f.). In this view, history is a transmission of ‘acts of speech, whether
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oral, scribal or typographical’. But the acts of speech are determined by the contexts ‘in
which these acts were performed’. The paroles of any historical actor always depended on
a specific langue: ‘For anything to be said or written or printed, there must be a language
to say it in; the language determines what can be said in it, but is capable of being
modified by what is said in it; there is a history formed by the interactions of parole and
langue’ (p. 20).
8. The frontispiece was printed only in luxury copies.
9. In fact, that was the purpose of the Sprat’s History, too.
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